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Abstract
Low labour market participation, together with the high effective tax wedge at low 
wage levels, create a fertile ground for the introduction of the in-work benefits 
(IWB) in Serbia. Our paper provides an ex-ante evaluation of the two IWB schemes, 
directed at stimulating the labour supply and more equal income distribution. The 
methodological approach combines the tax-and-benefit microsimulation model 
with the discrete labour supply model. Our results show that both individual and 
family-based IWB schemes would considerably boost labour market participation, 
although family-based benefits would have disincentivizing effects for the 
secondary earners in couples. Most of the behavioural changes take place among 
the poorest individuals, with significant redistributive effects.
Keywords: in-work benefits, labour supply, inequality, discrete choice model, 
microsimulation
Introduction
Low labour market participation, high informality, particularly at the bottom end 
of the earning distribution, and high formalization costs constitute theoretically 
a solid case for the introduction of making-work-pay policies, such as in-work 
benefits (IWB), which are means-tested benefits conditional on employment 
status. These policies have become popular in many European countries trying 
1 Corresponding author: Sunčica Vujić, Department of Economics, University of Antwerp, 
Prinsstraat 13, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium. Email: suncica.vujic@uantwerpen.be. Tel.: +32 
32 654 902.
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to promote labour market participation and work formal-
ization, particularly among low-paid workers. Empirical 
studies confirm that the IWB policies have been effective 
in tackling the above-mentioned labour market problems 
in developed countries, particularly in the United States 
(US) and the United Kingdom (UK) (Blundell et al., 2000; 
Blundell & Hoynes, 2004; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; 
Orsini, 2006). However, the empirical literature on the 
effectiveness of these policies in the European developing 
and transition economies is scarce. Our paper attempts to 
fill this gap.
A high labour force participation rate is important for 
economic growth, competitiveness, poverty reduction, and 
the political and social stability of a country, especially 
with an aging population. These are some of the reasons 
why the European Union 2020 (EU 2020) strategy set the 
employment rate target for 20- to 64-year-olds at 75% 
(European Commission, 2010). According to the Statis-
tical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS, 2016), the 
country’s average (over four quarters) labour force partic-
ipation rate of the working age population (15- to 64-year-
olds) was 60.5% in 2016, while the employment rate was 
45.2%; both of these indicators are far below the EU-28 
average of 73% for the labour force participation rate, and 
71% for the employment rate in 2016 (Eurostat, 2019a; 
OECD, 2019). Inactivity is particularly high among low-
skilled, low-income earners. Serbia’s active population 
will further decline in the current decade, due to the exit of 
baby boomers from the labour market, and the increasing 
outbound migration (Arandarenko et al., 2012). Since the 
onset of the global economic crisis, in addition to the de-
clining labour market participation, the informality rate has 
been on the rise, being particularly high in the agriculture 
and self-employment sectors, thus further reducing the res-
ervoir of formal labour market participation. 
Following the well-established theoretical base and em-
pirical framework for the evaluation of labour market ef-
fectiveness of the IWB policies (Bargain & Orsini, 2006; 
Blundell, 2000; Immervoll & Pearson, 2009; Saez, 2002), 
our research combines the EUROMOD-based tax-and-ben-
efit microsimulation model for Serbia (SRMOD) with a 
structural labour supply model, in order to evaluate the 
effects of the IWB policies, as well as the interplay between 
the IWB policies and other tax-and-benefit policies, on 
labour supply and income distribution in Serbia. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical estimation 
of labour supply effects of in-work benefits for a transition 
country. These results will be benchmarked to the results on 
the effects of IWBs for countries that are similar to Serbia 
in terms of labour market performance (high unemploy-
ment and inactivity rates, particularly for young people and 
women) and features of tax and benefit systems (lacking 
social assistance benefits). The results will be compared 
with those for other Western Balkan countries, as well 
as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece (which have similar 
labour market characteristics as Serbia). In addition, the 
results on labour supply elasticities will be compared to 
those for developed and other transition countries.
We see a threefold contribution of our paper to the existing 
literature. First, bearing in mind that the effectiveness of 
the IWB policies depends on their design, as well as on the 
institutional characteristics of a targeted country, our paper 
constitutes a new methodological framework taking into 
account the characteristics of the labour market of a tran-
sition country. The existing literature has mostly focused 
on the developed economies, while the empirical literature 
for the European transition economies, to the best of our 
knowledge, is limited to the evidence for Slovenia (Kosi 
& Bojnec, 2009), Poland (Myck et al., 2013), Macedonia 
(Mojsoska et al., 2015) and Serbia (Clavet et al., 2019; 
Ranđelović & Žarković-Rakić, 2013; Žarković-Rakić et al., 
2016). Second, since low labour market participation, high 
informality and high formal activation costs are common 
features of the Western Balkan economies, while the IWB 
policies are almost non-existent, the empirical results for 
Serbia may represent a considerable contribution not only 
to the existing empirical literature but also to a discussion 
on introducing making-work-pay policies in the region. 
Third, we provide evidence on the effectiveness of the IWB 
policies with respect to different family structures (singles 
and couples) and with respect to the position of women 
in the labour market. This is particularly important taking 
into account that inactivity rates of women in Serbia are 
considerably higher than those of men (76.6% and 63.8%, 
respectively, in the last quarter of 2016; SORS, 2016).
The results obtained in this paper suggest that both indi-
vidual IWB (IIWB) and family IWB (FIWB) would trigger 
a decline in labour market non-participation: the effects 
of FIWB are larger for singles, while the IIWB would 
have higher impact on the labour supply of individuals in 
couples. At the same time, the FIWB would have somewhat 
larger effects for single women than for men, the effects of 
IIWB being the opposite, while no significant difference in 
terms of labour supply reaction to the IIWB and the FIWB 
by gender is found in the case of coupled individuals. The 
policy is expected to yield positive effects on inequality, 
since most of the labour activation would happen at the 
lower end of the income distribution. The difference in the 
size of the effects of IIWB and FIWB, depending on the 
income level and marital status, is the consequence of the 
difference in the design of the IIWB and FIWB policies but 
also the result of variation in labour supply elasticities by 
income levels and marital status.
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3The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The 
next section provides an explanation of the participation and 
formalization disincentives coming from the tax-and-benefit 
system design. Section 3 deals with the analysis of the IWB 
design and the overview of empirical literature on the IWB 
policies. In section 4, the data and methodology are present-
ed, while the results are presented and discussed in section 
5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Tax-and-benefit System in Serbia: Why 
Working at Low Wage Levels Does Not Pay?
In this section, we provide further information on the char-
acteristics of the labour market in Serbia in general and 
the tax-and-benefit structures in particular. Serbia’s labour 
market performs considerably worse when compared to 
most other European economies. The labour market par-
ticipation rate currently stands at 63.4%, while the un-
employment rate is 18.8%. Inactivity and unemployment 
rates are particularly high among low-educated individu-
als. Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) 2007 
data, used in this paper, show that non-participation rates 
for those with primary education (55.5%) are significantly 
higher than for those with secondary (30.0%) and tertiary 
education (18.7%). At the same time, women are in a 
particularly difficult labour market position. On average, 
they face 16.6 percentage point higher inactivity rates and 
4.7 percentage point higher unemployment rates than men 
(Table 1). 
Arandarenko and Vukojević (2008) show that the tax-ben-
efit wedge in Serbia is rather regressive at the bottom of 
wage distribution, due to the high minimum social security 
contribution base, relatively high social contribution rates, 
low non-taxable threshold (for personal income taxation) 
and withdrawal of means-tested benefits. This has been con-
firmed by the World Bank study for Serbia (Koettl, 2010), 
which calculated the Implicit Costs of Formalization (ICF), 
defined as the share of income that an informal worker has 
to give up in order to formalize work, showing disincen-
tives for formalization stemming from labour taxation and 
benefit withdrawal. The study shows that a single person 
with no children who earns less than the minimum wage in 
the informal sector has to give up between 40% and 75% 
of income in order to formalize work.
Labour market participation in Serbia is among the lowest 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), being close to 
the activity rates in the Western Balkan countries, while 
the female participation rate is considerably lower than 
the male participation rate (Table 2). At the same time, 
income inequality in Serbia is among the highest in Europe 
(Davies, 2018).
Table 2. Labour market participation rates in the CEE (2014)
  Total Women Men
Czech Republic 73.3 65.6 80.9
EU-28 72.1 66.0 78.2
Slovenia 70.9 67.4 74.2
Slovakia 70.2 62.7 77.7
Bulgaria 68.1 64.2 72.0
CEE-average 67.8 61.3 74.3
Poland 67.3 60.5 74.2
Romania 65.0 57.3 72.8
FYR of Macedonia 64.6 51.5 77.3
Hungary 64.6 58.6 70.6
Croatia 64.1 58.6 69.7
Albania 63.0 51.7 74.2
Serbia 61.7 53.9 69.7
Montenegro 59.2 52.3 66.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 54.5 42.1 67.1
Source: World Bank Database
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Table 1. Non-participation and unemployment rates by level of education and gender (%)
  Total Men Women
Education level
Primary and less Secondary Higher
Unemployment rate 13.9 11.8 16.5 14.9 15.4 7.9
Inactivity rate 36.6 27.3 43.9 55.5 30 18.7
Notes: Working age population (15-64 years)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LSMS, 2007.
Low-education attainment coupled with a lack of work 
experience generates low earning capacity in the labour 
market. When earnings or potential earnings are low, in-
centives to seek employment or stay in employment are 
usually limited. Incentive problems are aggravated by high 
tax burdens on labour income and by cuts in social benefits 
designed to provide at least some safety nets for those with 
no or very low income (Immervoll & Pearson, 2009). 
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The labour tax wedge in Serbia for those with low earnings 
(67% of average wage) is among the largest in the CEE 
and is also higher than the EU-28 average (Figure 1). In 
addition, the degree of progressivity of labour taxation in 
Serbia is among the lowest in the CEE. When the wage 
increases from 67% of the average wage to 167% of the 
average wage, the labour tax wedge (as per cent of labour 
costs) in Serbia rises only by 1.3 percentage point, while in 
the CEE and the EU-28 the rise is considerably steeper — 
6.4 percentage point and 8.1 percentage point, respectively 
(Figure 1). 
The relatively high labour tax burden of low-paid jobs and 
low progressivity are the consequences of several factors, 
the most important being the mandatory minimum social 
security base and the sudden withdrawal of means-tested 
benefits upon formal employment.2 The minimum base, 
which is mandatory for every worker, is set at 35% of the 
average wage, implying that when the actual wage is below 
the minimum base, the social contributions are calculated 
on the minimum base. Given that the base is effectively not 
adjusted for working hours, the low-paid part-time jobs are 
exposed to a high social contribution burden. 
2 This is a peculiar feature of the social security contribution 
systems in the Western Balkan region. The most drastic example 
is Macedonia, where the mandatory base is set as high as 50% of 
average wage.
Additionally, the labour tax reform that was introduced 
in 2001 brought about the abolishment of fringe benefits. 
The two most important benefits of this kind were food 
allowances (paid monthly) and an annual leave benefit. 
Given that both fringe benefits were not taxed and were 
paid in equal amounts to each worker, the abolishment of 
these benefits contributed to the regressive character of the 
labour tax system, which was in effect until 2007 (Aran-
darenko & Vukojević, 2008). The changes to the labour tax 
system that took place in 2007 envisaged a cut in the wage 
tax rate between 12% and 14% and the introduction of the 
zero tax bracket (up to 5,000 Dinars (i.e., 63.1 Euro), or 
approximately 15% of the average wage). However, the tax 
burden on labour did not change considerably, given that 
the social security contributions dominated the tax wedge.3 
Another peculiarity of the Serbian labour market relates 
to relatively high informality. As put forward by Krstić 
and Sanfey (2011), between 2002 and 2007 informal work 
rates in Serbia rose despite strong economic growth and 
the improved business climate in the country. The authors 
argue that one possible reason for this unexpected result 
3 In 2001, contributions were set at 32.6% of the gross wage, 
equally split between employers and workers. The first increase 
in mandated contributions occurred in 2003, with an increase of 
1 percentage point. The next modification was made in 2004, 
and currently the overall social security tax rate amounts to 
35.8% of gross wage: 22% for old age, disability and survivors’ 
pensions, 12.3% for health insurance, and 1.5% for unemploy-
ment insurance.
Figure 1. Labour tax wedge and progressivity of labour taxation in the CEE (2014)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Eurostat Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2014 data and International 
Labour Organization (ILO) 2014 data
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5is the regressive character of the labour tax system that 
was introduced in 2001 and that was applied until January 
2007. The incentives to join the formal economy were 
diminished for both workers and employers. However, it 
should be noted that the high informality rate in Serbia was 
to a large extent driven by informal work in agriculture 
and self-employment, where informal workers accounted 
for 87% and 53% of the total number of workers, respec-
tively, while the average informal wage-employment was 
considerably lower, with a 10% share in the total number 
of wage-employees in 2007, thus being below the average 
for Southern Europe4 (Hazans, 2011).
Besides labour taxation, the social benefits design is another 
piece of the puzzle necessary to explain the high levels of 
inactivity and informality among the working-age popula-
tion in Serbia. Once a person has a formal income on her/
his record, major income-tested benefits (social assistance 
and child allowance in particular) will be decreased by the 
total amount of earned income or completely withdrawn. 
In their study on inactivity in the Serbian labour market, 
Arandarenko et al. (2012) show that a person receiving 
4 Southern Europe constitutes Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and 
Cyprus.
social benefits does not have an incentive to search for a 
job offering a salary below 20% of the average gross wage, 
which is equivalent to a part-time job equalling 20 hours 
at the minimum hourly wage. Mainly due to the mandato-
ry minimum social security contribution base, net income 
for this individual becomes equal to the amount of social 
assistance benefit. Therefore, the so-called mini-jobs and 
midi-jobs (mainly part-time jobs) are not economically 
attractive for low-wage earners.
As a result of the minimum social contribution base, 
sudden withdrawal of the means-tested benefits and other 
mentioned factors, the tax wedge distribution is regressive 
up to 33% of average wage, afterwards being only slightly 
progressive (Figure 2). At the same time, the implicit for-
malization costs are the highest at the very bottom of wage 
distribution.5 Such design of the tax-benefit scheme creates 
considerable disincentives for labour market participation 
of low-skilled individuals.
5 Implicit formalization costs are calculated as the percentage of 
initial income that a household has to give up in order to switch 
from the informal to the formal sector, assuming the gross wage 
offer is unchanged.
Figure 2. The tax wedge, implicit costs of formalization and the marginal effective tax rate for singles with no children in Serbia (2009)
Source: Koettl (2010)
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In-Work Benefits Objective, Design and Labour 
Supply Effects: Literature Review
The intention of policymakers to address the issue of in-
sufficient labour market participation and very low partic-
ipation of low-skilled, low-paid workers (thus, at the same, 
time tackling inequality and poverty issues) has brought 
the design of tax-and-benefit policies and their interplay 
back into the focus of empirical literature and discussions. 
Measures directed at increasing the income of persons with 
a low earnings capacity have mostly centred on the introduc-
tion of the IWB policies. The IWB policies are designed to 
promote work and reduce poverty by generating a difference 
between the incomes of working people and the counterfac-
tual situation, that is, the incomes they would have if they 
were out of work. Additionally, the IWB schemes contribute 
to higher formality by effectively reducing the labour tax 
wedge and thus encouraging wage formalization. 
The introduction and expansion of the IWBs in the European 
countries has been inspired by the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), introduced first in the US, and the subsequent 
Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) practice in the UK. 
The main motivations for the introduction of these policies 
in Europe and North America during the early 1990s were 
the low levels of labour force participation and employment 
experienced by certain specific demographic groups of 
working age (Blundell, 2006). In a theoretical framework, 
Kolm & Tonin (2011) show that IWBs can be extended 
to larger sections of the workforce and to other countries. 
Nowadays, most of the OECD countries apply some types 
of the IWB programs in order to boost labour market activity 
and employment (Immervoll, 2012; Immervoll & Pearson, 
2009). Even though there are differences among the coun-
tries in terms of the design of the IWBs, all employment-con-
ditional measures use at least one of the following criteria 
to assess eligibility and determine the amount of benefits: 
having children, working a minimum number of hours, and 
receiving income from work or entering into employment. 
Most of these benefits are proportional to gross income up 
to a maximum amount, afterwards being gradually with-
drawn. In other words, they are characterised by the gradual 
phase-in and phase-out brackets, as a mean of targeting indi-
viduals with specific earnings levels or working hours. 
An important aspect of the IWB design is the choice of the 
unit used to assess income (Orsini, 2006; Orsini & Bargain, 
2006). In some countries, eligibility for benefits is assessed 
at the household level, while in other countries it is focused 
on individuals. Family IWBs are more effective in boosting 
the labour supply of single individuals, due to discouraging 
effects on the second earners in households, who in most 
cases are women (Eissa & Hoynes, 1998). However, in 
certain cases, family benefits can have both redistributive 
and incentive effects. This is the case with lone parents 
that constitute a large part of poor households (Orsini & 
Bargain, 2006). On the other hand, individual-level benefits 
have greater work-incentive effects than do family-based 
benefits, since they do not discourage the participation of 
second earners in a couple (Blundell et al., 2000; Orsini & 
Bargain, 2006).
Most evaluations of labour supply effects and distributional 
effects of the IWB policies in European countries are ex ante 
evaluations based on a behavioural microsimulation frame-
work. For example, Blundell et al. (2000) have estimated the 
labour supply preferences on data not affected by the policy 
reforms, which were then used to simulate the impact of 
the introduction of the WFTC in the UK. The authors have 
found that the introduction of the WFTC leads to an increase 
in labour market participation rates for lone mothers and a 
small decline in labour market participation amongst women 
in couples, with no net effect on the labour market partici-
pation rates of men in couples.6 The results are consistent 
with the findings of Brewer et al. (2006). Bell (2005) has 
found that the decline in child poverty between the fiscal 
years 2002 and 2004 can be attributed to the introduction 
of the WFTC program in the UK. Brewer (2006) also noted 
that the WFTC program reduced the number of families 
in poverty. St Martin & Whiteford (2003) have estimated 
that the WFTC program produced about 100,000 new jobs, 
while the cost of this policy was about 1% of GDP. Orsini 
& Bargain (2006) have simulated the British WFTC scheme 
and the individualized wage subsidy scheme for Finland, 
France, and Germany, countries which have experienced 
severe poverty traps. They have found that the participation 
of married women declined in all three countries after the 
introduction of the WFTC, the negative effect being only 
partially offset by the positive impact of the reform on single 
women’s labour supply (in Finland and in Germany). On the 
other hand, they have found that individual IWB encour-
aged married women to take jobs. The effects in Finland 
were lower than in other countries, mainly due to the rel-
atively small labour supply elasticity. Both programs were 
found to have had significant anti-poverty effects. Haan & 
Myck (2007) also find strong disincentivizing effects of the 
British style IWB on coupled individuals, if implemented 
in Germany. Myck et al. (2013) have found evidence on the 
IWB-related disincentives on the work of secondary earners 
in Poland and provide proposals to tackle this issue. Saez 
(2002) has evaluated the making-work-pay policies in the 
US and showed that the IWB policies provide an optimal 
income transfer program when the labour supply choice is 
6 For the evaluation of the EITC, see Scholtz (1994, 1996), Eissa 
and Hoynes (1998), Eissa and Liebman (1996), and Meyer and 
Rosenbaum (2000). 
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7whether or not to work (extensive margin). On the other 
hand, if the labour supply choice is about intensity of work 
on the job (intensive margin), then the optimal transfer 
program is a classical Negative Income Tax program with a 
large guaranteed income-support schemes, which are taxed 
away at high rates.
The effectiveness of making-work-pay policies is funda-
mentally dependent on the labour market structure, inherent 
elasticities and the institutional set-up. Therefore, switching 
to an environment where participation is low, unemployment 
is high and institutions are weaker may change the expected 
outcomes of the IWB policies. With respect to this, several 
papers have emerged focusing on the southern European 
countries (particularly Italy), which share these features. 
Figari (2015) finds that the family IWB in Italy triggers an 
average increase of female labour supply by 3 percentage 
points, the individual IWB having stronger incentive effects 
on coupled women, since their labour supply increase is 
estimated at 5 percentage points. He also finds that most of 
the labour supply reactions induced by the IWB take place 
among the poorest individuals, with important redistributive 
effects. Similar results for Italy, especially for couples with 
children, are found in De Luca et al. (2013). Colonna & 
Marcassa (2013) show that the working tax credit in Italy 
boosts the labour force participation rate, particularly among 
unskilled and low-educated women. 
Late transition economies of Southeastern Europe have 
even more unfavourable labour market features than the 
Southern European countries, while making-work-pay 
policies (and empirical literature on this topic) are largely 
absent. Mojsoska et al. (2015) use a microsimulation frame-
work to assess the impact of the hypothetical IWB schemes 
in Macedonia and find that family IWBs are more effective 
in promoting the labour activation of singles, while individ-
ual benefits are more effective in the case of couples, with 
the effects in both cases being concentrated at the bottom 
of the income distribution with poverty reduction effects. 
Using the tax and benefit micro-simulation model for Serbia 
(SRMOD), Ranđelović and Žarković-Rakić (2013) provide 
empirical evidence on the incentive and distributional 
effects of the abolishment of the mandatory minimum social 
security contribution (SSC) base, showing that the reform 
would reduce effective average tax rates by more than it 
would reduce effective marginal tax rate, while the impact 
of the reform on the overall level of inequality, measured 
by the Gini coefficient, would be small. Žarković-Rakić et 
al. (2016) evaluates the impact of the minimum SSC base 
reform scenarios in Serbia on labour supply and employment 
formalization and conclude that the proposed reform would 
not significantly contribute to the transformation of informal 
full-time to formal full-time jobs. Clavet et al. (2019) 
evaluate the labour supply and distributive effects of several 
reform strategies concerning two major social transfers in 
Serbia: child allowance and social monetary assistance. The 
results show that, in a context of a low labour participation 
rate, and high unemployment and informality rates, a benefit 
strategy is by far the more cost-effective option for reducing 
child poverty than an employment strategy that aims to raise 
the work incentives for parents. 
Methodology: Behavioural Microsimulation 
Model, Data and Policy Reform Design
Model and Data
In order to analyse the potential effects of policy measures 
on labour supply incentives and income redistribution, this 
paper combines the tax-and-benefit microsimulation model 
for Serbia (SRMOD), which is based on the EUROMOD 
platform (Sutherland & Figari, 2013), with a structural, 
discrete choice, labour supply model.7 Similar to other mi-
crosimulation models, SRMOD is a tax-and-benefit calcula-
tor based on the micro-data on income, earnings, labour force 
participation and socio-demographic variables, allowing us 
to reproduce the budget constraint for each household (i.e., 
the latent set of working hours and household disposable 
income alternatives), while the labour supply model ration-
alizes observed behaviour. 
The policies simulated in SRMOD refer to Living Stand-
ards Measurement Survey (LSMS) dataset in 2007 as the 
baseline year. The LSMS in 2007 is a nationally represent-
ative survey (on 17,735 individuals divided in 5,575 house-
holds) conducted by the Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Serbia in cooperation with the World Bank. We have opted 
to use the LSMS dataset because it was the only compre-
hensive survey in Serbia providing the amount of social 
and economic information required for tax-and-benefit 
microsimulation modelling. Although we use the data from 
2007, labour market indicators are similar to 2015 not only 
in absolute but also in relative terms, across both gender and 
levels of educational attainment. According to the Labour 
Force Survey Data for Serbia in 2015, unemployment and 
inactivity rates for women were 4 and 15 percentage points 
higher than for men, respectively, which is comparable to the 
situation in 2007. Further, those having primary education or 
less still have significantly higher inactivity rates compared 
7 The main advantage of using discrete-choice instead of contin-
uous labour supply models comes from the possibility of ac-
counting for taxes and benefits (i.e., non-linear and non-convex 
budget sets; Van Soest, 1995), which is why these models have 
been extensively used for an ex-ante evaluation of hypothetical 
tax-and-benefit reforms.
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to individuals with secondary or tertiary education. Since the 
main labour market indicators (participation, employment, 
unemployment) were almost unchanged in 2015 compared 
to 2007, the dataset may still be regarded as relevant. The 
LSMS dataset contains separate data on formal and informal 
income from employment, self-employment and agriculture. 
According to the macro-validation results, formal employ-
ment incomes are lower than the actual amounts by 7%, 
with the difference being attributed to informal salaries 
and wages. In the case of agricultural and self-employment 
earners, the share of informal income in the actual income 
is much larger – 56% and 22%, respectively. Taxes, social 
contributions and benefits in SRMOD are simulated using 
the data on formal income, since both taxes and benefits are 
determined based on the formal income. 
Personal income tax, social security contributions and major 
means-tested benefits (monetary social assistance and child 
allowance) are the main tax-benefit programs simulated in 
SRMOD, while for most of the non-means-tested benefits 
(e.g., birth grant, old age pensions, unemployment benefits, 
caregiver allowance, maternity and childcare benefits) 
reported values are used, which is a common approach 
in other EUROMOD and related models, determined by 
the data availability.8 Personal income tax is simulated 
using the rules applicable in a year of the given dataset, 
which means that incomes from various sources are taxed 
at different, but always flat, tax rates ranging between 
10% and 20%. Wages, as the largest source of income 
in Serbia, are taxed at the flat rate of 12%, applied to the 
amount of gross wages exceeding non-taxable threshold, 
which in 2007 amounted to RSD 5,050 per month.. Social 
security contributions are calculated on all gross labour 
incomes, applying the rate of 22% for pension and disa-
bility insurance contributions, 12.3% for health insurance 
and 1.5% for unemployment insurance and the regulations 
on the minimum base (35% of the average wage) and the 
maximum base (five times average wage) for social con-
tributions. All social contributions are equally split among 
employers and employees. Monetary social assistance is 
the last-resort financial assistance program, means-tested 
against the total income (per household member), as well 
the land and buildings area (per household member) owned 
by the household. Thus, individuals or families who pass 
the means test are entitled to the benefit calculated using 
the following scale: i) for the first adult person in a family, 
the basic amount (RSD 7,628 per month) multiplied by 1; 
ii) for each additional adult person in a family, the basic 
amount multiplied by 0.5; and iii) for each child up to the 
age of 18, the basic amount multiplied by 0.3. Individuals 
incapable of work, and families with all members incapable 
8 Detailed descriptions of the policies simulated in SRMOD are 
provided in Ranđelović and Žarković-Rakić (2013).
of work, as well as lone-parent families with one or two 
children (below the age of 18) are entitled to an increased 
amount of this benefit (by 20%). Child allowance is the 
means-tested benefit aimed at reducing poverty in families 
with children. Eligibility is limited to the households in 
which total monthly net income per family member does 
not exceed a certain threshold (RSD 4,705 per month), 
while the amount of the benefit is flat (RSD 1,490 per 
month), with only the first four children in the family being 
entitled to this benefit.
The results of macro-validation of SRMOD simulations are 
satisfactory, since the margin between the simulated income 
tax and social contributions compared to the administrative 
data ranges between 5% and 20%, a large share of discrep-
ancy being attributed to the underreporting of income and 
sampling issues in the survey, since the average wage in 
the dataset is 8% lower than the one published by the Sta-
tistical Office (Ranđelović & Žarković-Rakić, 2013). The 
discrepancy between the simulated benefits and the amounts 
disclosed in administrative datasets is even lower, ranging 
from 5% to 15%. Using the data on market income, simu-
lated taxes, social contributions and means-tested benefits, 
as well the reported (non-simulated) benefits, SRMOD 
provides calculations of the household disposable income, 
replacement rates, and effective marginal tax rates. 
In this paper, we estimate two discrete choice labour supply 
models, thus specifying separately preferences of singles 
and couples. Labour supply model estimation is restricted to 
the ‘labour market flexible’ individuals whose labour supply 
behaviour can be captured by the econometric model. There-
fore, disabled individuals, students, pensioners, and self-em-
ployed individuals are dropped, which is a common approach 
in the labour supply literature (Blundell et al., 2000; Figari, 
2015; Haan & Myck, 2007). An additional reason to exclude 
the self-employed from the model is related to difficulties 
with measurement of their true hours and wages (Löfler et 
al., 2014). Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample 
are provided in the Appendix (Table A1). Since the model 
mostly deals with wage employment, similar to the litera-
ture on Southern European countries, it is focused on formal 
work, with the similar or slightly higher wage-employment 
informality (De Luca et al., 2013, Figari, 2015). Discrete 
choice labour supply models are based on the assumption 
that a household can choose among a finite number of J+1 
working hours. Each hour j=0,...,J corresponds to a given 
level of disposable income of individual , and each discrete 
bundle of working hours and income provides a different 
level of utility. In other words, the utility of a household i 
making the choice j, Vij, is given by: 
Vij = U (Hfij,Hmij,Iij,Zi) + εij
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part of the utility function, as in Blundell et al. (2000). The 
deterministic part of the utility function depends on the 
spouses’ working hours (Hfij,Hmij), disposable income (Iij), 
and the vector Zi of  describing households’ characteristics 
(age, gender, education level of the household members 
and parenthood). For a couple, choices j=0,...,J correspond 
to all combinations of the spouses’ discrete working hours. 
Starting from the empirical distribution of the working 
hours, we assume that each partner may work 0, 20, or 40 
hours, corresponding to non-participation, part-time, and 
full-time work. This implies that a couple can choose among 
nine alternative combinations of working hours. Each alter-
native is characterised by a triplet of disposable income and 
working hours of female and male partner.
Disposable income, Iij is the tax-benefit function (G), which 
depends on female and male hourly wages (Wfij,Wmij) and 
hours of work (Hfij,Hmij), as well as on the non-labour 
income (Yi) and households’ characteristics (Zi): 
Iij = G (Wfij,Wmij,Hfij,Hmij,Yi,Zi)
When estimating the discrete labour supply model, hourly 
wage is not observed for inactive and unemployed workers 
in the sample. Since their labour market status is correlated 
with the potential wage offer, dropping unemployed and 
inactive workers would trigger selection bias. In order to 
avoid this,, the Heckman selection model is used in order 
to impute hourly wages for males and females supplying 
zero hours (Heckman, 1976; 1979). We then use SRMOD to 
calculate their labour and disposable incomes corresponding 
to a discrete set of working time alternatives.
Once disposable income Iij is obtained for all the choices (j) 
and all the individuals (i), the conditional logit function is 
estimated by the maximum-likelihood estimation approach, 
in order to estimate preference parameters of the utility 
function. Labour supply effects are estimated by comparing 
the predicted probability of each choice under the pre-re-
form and post-reform conditions. 
In countries with the constraint on the demand side of the 
labour market (which is the case in Serbia), the labour supply 
model is partial. Although this is a limit of the labour supply 
approach to evaluation of the labour market effects, most 
of the previously mentioned empirical studies on making-
work-pay policy effects take into account only the labour 
supply response, even though the authors recognize the rel-
evance of the demand constraint. There are also studies that 
implicitly encompass the labour demand effects by using 
involuntary unemployment to describe the labour demand 
reaction (Bargain et al. 2010). However, use of this approach 
is limited to the datasets that provide the information on 
involuntary unemployment, which is not the case with the 
LSMS for Serbia in 2007.  
Policy Design
Although most OECD countries apply some sort of IWBs 
(OECD, 2009), the American EITC and the British WFTC 
are the most commonly analysed and discussed. The British 
scheme of IWBs has recently been considered as a potential 
model to be introduced in the Southern European countries 
(e.g., Italy, Spain, etc.), in order to support the labour market 
participation of women and poor households (Owens, 2006; 
Figari 2010).
Given the pioneering role of the British experience in these 
policies, we simulate the family based IWB using the British 
WFTC structure as an example. The ratio between the thresh-
olds of eligibility and the maximum amounts of the benefit in 
this paper is calibrated, in order to get fiscal costs of 0.14% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in static terms, which is 
equivalent to half of the monetary social assistance program 
costs. Currently, a half of the total number of monetary social 
assistance beneficiaries are physically healthy individuals, 
which has urged the government to propose measures aimed 
at activating benefit recipients. Therefore, the government 
has recently introduced a wage subsidy equal to the minimum 
wage for part-time work, which is available to physically 
healthy social assistance recipients who accept work offered 
by the National Employment Bureau. Family IWB (FIWB2) 
and FIBW3 policies (defined later) proposed in this paper 
are, to a certain extent, similar to the proposed wage subsidy 
scheme, which was an additional reason to opt for the same 
budgetary costs. When deciding on the total budget, we have 
also taken into account the need to achieve a substantial 
increase in wages (of low-wage earners), thus creating the 
solid ground for considerable labour supply response, while 
at the same time taking into account the political and fiscal 
sustainability of the policy.
Depending on the structure of the family, there are three 
types of family IWB (FIWB), and one individual IWB 
(IIWB). FIWBs are differentiated by the family structure 
(single vs. lone parents and couples), as well as by the 
number of working hours, which is why there are three al-
ternative FIWB schemes (Table 3). The amount of benefits 
is fixed, and the eligible family receives them until their 
labour incomes and pensions reach certain threshold, with 
the benefit being gradually phased out afterward (by 0.37 
dinars for every additional dinar of income) and at some 
point reaching zero. In order to have working incentives 
not only for people with low earnings but also for people 
with low hourly wages, an individual-based benefit scheme 
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IIWB is developed. IIWB treats all the workers in the same 
manner regardless of their family status, so all individuals 
who work at least 16 hours per week and whose income is 
below the stipulated threshold are entitled to the benefit, 
which is gradually phased in (0.36 dinars of benefits for 
every earned dinar). When income reaches certain thresh-
old, gradual phase-out (at the rate of 0.37 dinars for every 
additional dinar of income) begins. 
Although the total costs of both IIWB and FIWB are the same, 
the mean FIWB amounts to RSD 5,020 (approximately 14% 
of the average wage), while mean IIWB equals RSD 3,426 
(approximately 9% of the average wage). The mean amount 
of IIWB is the same for singles and coupled individuals, while 
the average FIWB is somewhat lower for singles. The effects 
of the IWB schemes on disposable income of the typical (hy-
pothetical) households are presented in Figures 3 and 4.
Table 3. Parameters of the family and individual in-work benefits (monthly amounts)
  FIWB1 FIWB2 FIWB3 IIWB
Type of tax unit Single Couples with children and lone parents
Couples without 
children
Lone parents and 
couples All
Assessment unit Family Family Family Family Individual
Minimum working hours per week 40 16 30 40 16
Amount of benefit 6,667 8,333 10,000 varying
Withdraw start threshold 15,000 17,500 19,167 14,333
Phase-in rate - - - 0.36
Phase-out rate 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Notes: FIWB refer to the Family IWB, IIWB refer to the individual IWB; 1, 2 and 3 refer to different parameterization of FIWB programs
Figure 3. Effects of the IWB schemes on disposable income: singles with no children
Figure 4. Effects of the IWB schemes on disposable income: couples with two children
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Results
Heckman Wage Equation, Utility Function and Labour 
Supply Elasticities
The estimated coefficients of the Heckman wage and se-
lection equations are presented in the Appendix (Table 
A2). The coefficients have the expected signs and magni-
tudes. The estimated parameters of the utility function are 
also presented in the Appendix (Tables A3a for singles 
and Table A3b for couples). Utility functions describe the 
marginal utility (disutility) of income and work, taking 
into account the heterogeneity of preferences captured by 
the demographic characteristics (age, education and par-
enthood) and the fixed costs of working. Our results on 
the utility function parameter estimation are in accordance 
with the expectations, indicating positive and diminishing 
marginal utility of income and increasing marginal disutility 
of working hours for both singles and couples. The results 
further show that the marginal utility of income decreases 
with age (at a diminishing rate) for singles and married men 
and with the level of education (except for single men). On 
the other hand, the marginal disutility of working hours in-
creases with age and level of education for both singles and 
couples. Furthermore, parenthood has no significant impact 
on preferences of singles due to a small sample size of single 
mothers and fathers, while increasing the utility of income 
for couples. The results are robust to changes of the sample 
of the non-employed (unemployed versus inactive) and to 
the exclusion of informal employment.9 
Starting from the estimated utility function parameters, we 
have calculated the labour supply elasticities at both ex-
tensive (labour force participation) and intensive margins 
9 For inactive and unemployed workers in the sample, hourly wage 
is not observed. In order to calculate disposable income for these 
workers, the hourly wage rate is estimated on the whole sample of 
working-age individuals (employed, unemployed or inactive) and 
imputed for males and females supplying zero hours.  Inactivity 
is the extreme form of unemployment in the sense that inactive 
workers are unemployed, are not looking for a job, and are not im-
mediately available for work when a job is offered to them. Classi-
fication into the inactive population is based on the self-evaluation 
of individuals about their efforts to search for a job.  Therefore, 
persons with the same “unemployed” labour market status could 
be classified into two different groups depending on the variation 
in their answers. Thus, the boundary between these two groups 
is sometimes arbitrary. However, they are similar with respect to 
both not working and not having wages in the data; thus, from 
the perspective of estimating and imputing wages for inactive and 
unemployed workers, it is correct to treat them as a one group (this 
is a standard procedure in the Heckman model, see for example, 
Figari 2010; 2015). Nevertheless, in the robustness checks, we 
take into account the difference between unemployed and inactive 
workers, and we exclude those who are in informal employment, 
since the empirical literature suggests that labour supply decisions 
differ between formal and informal employment.
(hours of work) (Table 4). Elasticities are obtained by in-
creasing the gross hourly wage by 1% under the pre-reform 
tax-benefit system and estimating the changes in the partic-
ipation rate and the average number of working hours after 
this change in policy. The results show that elasticities do not 
differ much between single men and single women, while 
the labour supply elasticity of married women is higher than 
that of married men. 
Table 4. Hours of work and participation elasticity for singles 
and couples
Singles Couples
Total Females Males Total Females Males
Total 
elasticity10 0.525 0.498 0.541 0.355 0.487 0.277
Participation 
elasticity 0.486 0.459 0.500 0.331 0.460 0.253
There are numerous studies estimating labour supply elastic-
ities for developed countries. The survey articles of Blundell 
and MaCurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2010) report 
that the range of estimates is very wide: values typically 
range between zero and 0.12 for men and between 0.05 and 
2 for women. A recent paper by Bargain et al. (2013) gives 
the first large-scale international comparison of elasticities 
(for 17 European countries and the US) and finds that wage 
elasticities are small and vary less across the countries 
than previously thought. For example, the paper finds that 
both hours of work and participation elasticities of married 
women range between 0.2 and 0.6, while for married men 
this range is even more compressed, between 0.05 and 0.15. 
They also point out that elasticities for married women 
(0.2-0.6) are higher in the countries with large non-partic-
ipation (such as Greece, Spain and Ireland). Elasticities for 
single women range between 0.1 and 0.4, while for single 
men this range is further compressed, between zero and 
0.3. Evidence on the labour supply behaviour in transition 
and post-transition countries is limited, and most deals 
with the early transition. For example, a recent paper by 
Bargain et al. (2013) finds very low male and female labour 
supply elasticity (0.1-0.2) in Estonia, Hungary and Poland, 
with the difference between coupled and single individuals 
being relatively small. However, the paper by Mojsoska et 
al. (2015) finds slightly higher elasticities in Macedonia for 
coupled men and women, between 0.6 and 0.8, as well as 
for single men (1.0-1.1), while the estimated elasticities for 
single women are somewhat lower (0.2-0.3). Comparison 
of our results with the results from other studies indicate 
that the estimated values of hours of work and participation 
elasticities in Serbia fall within the range reported in other 
10 Total elasticity accounts for hours and participation elasticity
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countries, particularly being similar to those that experience 
low participations rate, like Spain, Greece and Macedonia.  
According to the optimal taxation literature, IWBs can be 
considered as optimal transfers when labour supply elastic-
ities are large (Brewer et al., 2010). Looking at the distribu-
tion of elasticities reveals considerable variation across the 
quintile groups (i.e., we find the evidence on labour supply 
elasticity declining with income; Figure 5). This fact is often 
ignored in the literature, with the exception of Aaberge et 
al. (1999) and Roed & Strom (2002), who point to the po-
tential responsiveness of the individuals at the bottom of 
the income distribution. A pro-low-wage-earners bias in the 
design of the IWB schemes in our paper, together with the 
higher labour supply elasticities at the bottom of the income 
distribution, provide fertile ground for the effectiveness 
of IWBs in Serbia, since the conditions identified by Saez 
(2002) and Brewer et al. (2010) are met.
Labour Supply Effects
Starting from the estimated preferences in the utility function 
and the simulated changes in disposable income due to the 
introduction of in-work benefits, the changes in probabilities 
associated with different labour supply choices have been 
estimated (Figure 6).
Both IIWB and FIWB schemes would trigger a decline 
in the non-participation of single persons, with the effects 
being larger in the case of FIWB (non-participation would 
decline by 8.8 percentage points; i.e., 79,000 individuals 
would be activated) than in the case of IIWB (decrease in 
non-participation by 6.3 percentage points; i.e., equivalent 
to 56,000 individuals); this result is similar to the one pre-
sented in Mojsoska et al. (2015). Under both schemes, most 
of the activated individuals would opt for full-time employ-
ment, while only a limited number of them would switch 
from inactivity to part-time employment. 
Although both IIWB and FIWB programs would also yield 
positive effects on the labour market participation of indi-
viduals in couples, the effects on the labour supply of this 
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Figure 5. Labour supply elasticities by quintiles
Note: Full tables of the effects are presented in the Tables A4a and 
A4b in the Appendix.
Figure 6. Labour market participation choices without and 
with IWB (in %) – total
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subgroup would be smaller than in case of single persons, 
mostly due to lower labour supply elasticity. Thus, the IIWB 
scheme would trigger a decline in the non-participation of 
coupled individuals by 3.1 percentage points (approximate-
ly 41,000 individuals), while the effects of FIWB are not 
statistically significant (Table A4b in the Appendix). These 
results imply that the IIWB scheme would be more efficient 
in reducing non-participation of persons in couples, while 
the FIWB scheme would be more useful in tackling the issue 
of inactivity of single individuals. This may be explained by 
the labour supply disincentives of the FIWB for secondary 
earners, as is also found in other papers (Orsini & Bargain, 
2006; Haan & Myck 2007, Myck et al. 2013).
With respect to the labour supply effects by gender, we find 
that FIWB would yield slightly larger effects for single 
women than for single men, while the effects of IIWB 
would be the opposite (Figure 7). On the other hand, we find 
no statistically significant effects of either of the two IWB 
programs on the labour supply of coupled individuals when 
analysed by gender (Table A4b, in the Appendix).
Since the IWB schemes are also aimed at reducing poverty, 
the effects of hypothetical IWB schemes in Serbia are 
observed separately for the low-income population (those in 
the first quintile) and for high-income individuals (those in 
the fifth quintile). The results presented in Figure 8 show 
that both IWB schemes would considerably boost the labour 
market participation of people in the first quintile. Before 
the introduction of the IIWB, only 0.7% of single individu-
als from the bottom quintile have participated in the labour 
market. This is often the case with families with only one 
working household member. After the introduction of the 
IIWB, 18.4% of bottom-quintile single individuals would 
switch from non-participation to full-time employment, 
while 2.6% of them would opt for part-time employment. 
In the case of the FIWB, the labour supply effects on the 
bottom quintile individuals would be even larger: 22.3% 
would switch to full-time employment and 4.4% to part-
time employment. On the other hand, neither of the two 
IWB schemes would have statistically significant effects on 
the labour supply decision of singles from the top income 
quintile. 
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Figure 7. Labour market participation choices without and 
with IWB (in %) – by gender
Note: Full tables of the effects are presented in the tables A4a and 
A4b in the Appendix.
Figure 8. Labour market participation without and with IWB 
(in %) - the 1st and the 5th quintile
Note: Full tables of the effects (total and by gender) are presented 
in the tables A4a and A4b in the Appendix
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In the case of individuals in couples, the IIWB would boost 
the probability of a shift from non-participation to full-
time employment by 6.5 percentage points and to part-time 
employment by 0.5 percentage points, while the effects of 
FIWB would be significantly lower (1.6 percentage points 
and 0.2 percentage points, respectively). As in the case of 
single individuals, the labour supply effects of the FIWB 
and the IIWB on coupled individuals from the top quintile 
are not statistically significant. Large differences in terms 
of labour supply reaction to the IWB schemes at the bottom 
and the top quintile are the consequence of the design of the 
IWB schemes (pro-poor bias), as well of the higher labour 
supply elasticities at the lower end of the income distribution. 
The analysis of labour supply reactions by gender suggests 
that in the top and in the bottom quintile, a change in the 
non-participation rates due to the introduction of the IWB 
schemes, both for women and for men, would be consistent 
with the total effects (Tables A4a and A4b in the Appendix). 
The formal employment effects of the IWB schemes might 
be slightly larger if the formalization effects are accounted 
for. However, the results on the low formal–informal elas-
ticity at extensive margin (labour force participation) may 
suggest these effects would be small.
Analysis of labour supply effects by income levels suggests 
that for both singles and couples, the IWB schemes would 
have larger labour supply effects in the case of low-wage 
earners than for those with high incomes, which implies 
that these schemes would be beneficial from poverty and 
inequality reduction perspectives as well. This is consistent 
with the findings in other studies (Colonna & Marcassa, 
2013; Figari, 2015), and represents an important finding for 
Serbia, given that the country has one of the highest Gini 
coefficients in Europe (Eurostat 2019b). Since the FIWB 
would perform better in terms of the labour supply of low 
income singles, while the IIWB would perform better 
in terms of the labour supply of low income couples, the 
overall effect on the change in income distribution would 
be almost equal under both programs. The results show 
that after the introduction of the IIWB, the Gini coefficient 
would decline from 0.386 to 0.363, while in the case of the 
FIWB it would drop to 0.359. Slight differences in equaliz-
ing effects may arise from the fact that low earners receive 
the full amount of the benefit under the FIWB scheme, while 
in the case of the IIWB, the benefit is gradually phased in, 
reaching the full amount only when the threshold amount of 
earned income is generated. On the other hand, the fact that 
under the FIWB, a beneficiary is receiving the full amount 
of benefits even when earning low income could discour-
age low-paid earners to increase their labour supply above 
the minimum level necessary to qualify for this benefit. 
Although the equity-efficiency trade-off is common when 
introducing family and individual-based IWB, our results 
show that such a trade-off in Serbia would not be significant, 
since the differences in equalizing effects of the IIWB and 
the FIWB would be relatively small.
Conclusions
It is often argued that high inactivity and informality rates in 
Serbia are the consequence of the unfavourable design of the 
tax-and-benefit system, under which low-paid workers ac-
cepting a formal job (especially a part-time job), tend to lose 
more through withdrawal of benefits and increase in labour 
taxes then they get compensated through wages. This is par-
ticularly true for individuals with low earnings capacity (i.e., 
persons with low education attainment and little or no work 
experience), who constitute the majority of those who are 
inactive or who work in the informal sector.
Tax-and-benefit policy reforms in the OECD countries 
in recent years have been focused on solving the twin 
problem of in-work poverty and persistent labour market 
difficulties of low-skilled individuals. Employment-con-
ditional cash transfers to individuals facing labour market 
challenges have been a core element of the IWB policies 
for some time and are in use in more than half of the OECD 
countries (OECD, 2009). In the meantime, plenty of em-
pirical studies have emerged, showing significant positive 
employment effects among those primarily targeted by 
the payment of these benefits. Although many Central and 
Eastern European countries have started to experiment with 
the IWB policies, evidence on their effects is still scarce. 
For Poland, for example, Myck et al. (2013) propose several 
reforms to the current system of in-work benefits in order to 
reduce negative effects of the transfer to the second earner 
in couples, most of them being women. The evidence on 
the effects of these policies in Southeastern Europe is also 
limited: Kosi and Bojnec (2009) for Slovenia, Mojsoska 
et al. (2015) for Macedonia, and Ranđelović and Žark-
ović-Rakić (2013), Žarković-Rakić  et al. (2016) and Clavet 
et al. (2019) for Serbia. 
Results obtained in this paper suggest that both IIWB and 
FIWB would trigger a decline in labour market non-partic-
ipation, with the effects of FIWB being larger for singles, 
while IIWB would have a higher impact on the labour 
supply of individuals in couples. At the same time, FIWB 
would have somewhat larger effects for single women than 
for men, with the effects of IIWB being the opposite, while 
no significant difference in terms of labour supply reaction 
to IIWB and FIWB by gender is found in the case of coupled 
individuals. With regards to the distributional aspects, we 
find that both IWB schemes would have a larger impact on 
the stimulation of the labour supply of low-income individ-
uals than the labour supply of those at the top of the income 
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distribution; this is important, since non-participation is ex-
tremely high among the low-income population. This means 
that IWB policies in Serbia would not only help reduce 
non-participation but also, to a certain degree, help reduce 
inequality, with net positive fiscal effects. The difference 
in the size of effects of IIWB and FIWB, depending on the 
income level and marital status, is not only the consequence 
of the difference in design of IIWB and FIWB policies but 
also the result of variation in labour supply elasticities by 
income levels and marital status. 
The results of this paper would certainly be important for 
informing the policymaking process in Serbia, as the gov-
ernment has recently started experimenting with policies 
similar to the IWB schemes. Given that the labour market 
structure and the design of the tax-and-benefit system in 
Serbia are quite similar to those of neighbouring countries, 
we believe that the results of our analysis could also be of 
interest to a wider range of economies in the region.
The limitations of this paper, which also provide scope for 
further research, are as follows. First, this paper investigates 
the labour supply of IWB policy, while the labour demand 
analysis is beyond its scope. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that when there is involuntary unemployment, not 
all individuals who want to work are successful in finding 
a job. The employment effect of the IWB depends not only 
on the motivation of individuals to look for a job but also on 
the labour market capacity to accommodate them. In other 
words, the employment effects of IWB schemes would be 
also dependent on the state of the labour demand, suggesting 
that during times of economic prosperity there will be bigger 
employment gains after the introduction of the IWB than 
during crisis. There are studies that implicitly encompass the 
labour demand effects by using involuntary unemployment 
to describe the labour demand reaction (Bargain et al. 2010). 
However, use of this approach is limited to the datasets that 
provide the information on involuntary unemployment, 
which is not the case with the LSMS for Serbia in 2007. 
Second, the paper does not take into account general equi-
librium effects. The paper by Kolm and Tonin (2011) does 
take such effects into account in a theoretical framework and 
shows how IWBs policies can be extended to larger sections 
of the workforce. Third, this type of analysis is inherent-
ly static; microsimulation was only used in an accounting 
manner (day after), and disposable income of a representa-
tive sample of the population was calculated before and after 
a reform using a tax-and-benefit calculator. Li and O’Dono-
ghue (2013) provide an overview of the literature and the 
data requirements for the dynamic microsimulation models. 
Finally, although we justify in the paper why the policies 
simulated in SRMOD refer to the LSMS for Serbia in 2007 
as the baseline year, the more recent SILC data for Serbia 
could be utilized, as in Žarković-Rakić  et al. (2016) and 
Clavert et al. (2019).
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Descriptive statistics for the labour supply estimation
mean std. dev. min max
Secondary education 0.604 0.489 0 1
Tertiary education 0.154 0.361 0 1
Working experience 13.171 11.867 0 48
Settlement (Urban==1) 0.575 0.494 0 1
Region Vojvodina 0.257 0.437 0 1
Region West Serbia 0.306 0.461 0 1
Region East Serbia 0.262 0.440 0 1
Children under 3 years 0.125 0.373 0 3
Single 0.330 0.470 0 1
Age 40.359 11.917 18 64
Non-work hh income per adult equivalent (in 1.000 RSD) 3.332 5.537 0 75.80175
Total sample 6,473
Table A2. Wage equation for females and males, with Heckman correction
Females Males
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Hourly wage rate (ln)        
Primary education (omitted) - -
Secondary education 0.348*** (0.040) 0.207*** (0.035)
Tertiary education 0.894*** (0.049) 0.698*** (0.045)
Working experience 0.009*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001)
Settlement (Urban==1) 0.185*** (0.027) 0.178*** (0.025)
Region Belgrade (omitted) - -
Region Vojvodina -0.192*** (0.037) -0.195*** (0.039)
Region West Serbia -0.291*** (0.036) -0.226*** (0.036)
Region East Serbia -0.348*** (0.038) -0.312*** (0.039)
Constant 4.341*** (0.071) 4.708*** (0.058)
Employment (1 = in employment)
Primary education (omitted) - -
Secondary education 0.323*** (0.070) 0.188*** (0.073)
Tertiary education 0.909*** (0.089) 0.812*** (0.108)
Working experience 0.096*** (0.006) 0.097*** (0.007)
Settlement (Urban==1) 0.021 (0.054) -0.246*** (0.058)
Region Belgrade (omitted) - -
Region Vojvodina -0.145* (0.081) -0.030 (0.091)
Region West Serbia -0.081 (0.077) -0.040 (0.086)
Region East Serbia -0.120 (0.079) -0.035 (0.090)
Children under 3yoa -0.528*** (0.078) 0.043 (0.076)
Single 0.251*** (0.063) -0.130* (0.071)
Age 0.173*** (0.021) 0.202*** (0.017)
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Females Males
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age squared -0.003*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000)
Non-work hh income per adult eq. (in 1.000 RSD) -0.016*** (0.005) -0.028*** (0.005)
Constant -2.980*** (0.380) -2.661*** (0.344)
Rho 0.33 (0.087) -0.0049 (0.090)
Lambda 0.19 (0.046) -0.0025 (0.050)
Sigma 0.57 (0.021) 0.51 (0.023)
 
Observations 3,430 3,043
Censored N 1733 802
Wald test: joint significance [Chi2 (5)] 549.61 506.93
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): 15.7 0.0030
Prob > chi2: 0.000 0.96  
Table A3a. Preference estimates for singles (Conditional Logit)
Total Females Males
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Income 5.186*** (0.715) 5.145*** (0.966) 5.477*** (1.174)
*Age -0.221*** (0.038) -0.211*** (0.055) -0.248*** (0.061)
*Age square (/100) 0.270*** (0.047) 0.271*** (0.073) 0.298*** (0.074)
*Secondary ed.(a) -0.522*** (0.156) -0.802*** (0.259) -0.254 (0.247)
*Tertiary ed. -0.461*** (0.130) -0.751** (0.382) -0.035 (0.280)
* Children .(b) 0.112 (0.199) -0.049 (0.241) 0.431 (0.467)
Square -0.017*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.004) -0.024*** (0.009)
Income* Hours of work 0.002* (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002)
Hours of work -0.532*** (0.029) -0.540*** (0.039) -0.529*** (0.048)
*Age 0.017*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.019*** (0.003)
*Age square (/100) -0.022*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.003) -0.024*** (0.003)
*Secondary ed. .(a) 0.027*** (0.006) 0.037*** (0.010) 0.015 (0.010)
*Tertiary ed. 0.021*** (0.007) 0.021 (0.021) 0.008 (0.017)
* Children.(b) -0.003 (0.022) 0.017 (0.030) -0.048 (0.039)
Square 0.005*** (0.000) 0.005*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000)
Fixed costs - - -
* Children -0.578 (0.758) -0.586 (1.115) -0.187 (1.130)
N (c) 1,992 3,231 2,745
Pseudo R Square 0.303 0.312 0.312
Log-likelihood -1525 -814.6 -691.1
Wald test: joint sig [Chi2 (16)] 1327.35 628.13 737.24
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes:
(a)Primary education omitted
.(b)Dummy variable for single family with child
.(c)Estimated on the total of 5,976 observations = number of singles in the sample (1,992) multiplied by number of choices in simulation (3) 
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Table A3b. Preference estimates for couples (Conditional logit) 
Total Female Male
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Income -0.358 (0.665)
*Age 0.045 (0.034) -0.040 (0.035)
*Age square (/100) -0.041 (0.040) 0.059 (0.040)
*Secondary ed.(a) -0.120* (0.069) -0.120* (0.069)
*Tertiary ed. -0.057 (0.095) -0.057 (0.095)
* Children .(b) 0.452*** (0.112)
Square -0.004*** (0.001)
Income * Hours of work 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
Hours of work -0.388*** (0.038) -0.286*** (0.040)
*Age 0.009*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002)
*Age square (/100) -0.013*** (0.002) -0.013*** (0.002)
*Secondary ed. .(a) 0.028*** (0.005) -0.007 (0.005)
*Tertiary ed. 0.039*** (0.009) -0.021** (0.009)
* Children.(b) -0.037*** (0.006) -0.021*** (0.006)
* Female and male hours 
Interaction (/100) 0.033*** (0.010)
Square 0.005*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000)
Fixed costs - -
* Children -0.043 (0.247) 0.194 (0.213)
N (c) 1,543
Pseudo R Square 0.346
Log-likelihood -2218
Wald test: joint sig.
 [Chi2 (30)] 2343.89
Prob > Chi2 0.000
Notes:
 (a)Primary education omitted
.(b)Dummy variable for single family with child
.(c)Estimated on the total of 13,887 observations = number of couples in the sample (1,543) multiplied by number of choices (9)
Table A4a. Effects of the reforms for singles - percentages and number of people for each choice, total, first and fifth quintile
Share of the choices Change (in pp) Number of people per choice Change
no IWB with iIWB with fIWB iIWB fIWB no IWB iIWB fIWB iIWB fIWB
Total Non-participation 42.1% 35.8% 33.3% -6.3** -8.8** 377,842 321,568 298,738 -56,274 -79,104
Part-time 7.3% 7.7% 8.7% 0.4 1.4 65,666 69,464 78,144 3,798 12,478
Full-time 50.6% 56.4% 58.0% 5.9** 7.4** 453,553 506,029 520,179 52,476 66,626
Female Non-participation 43.6% 37.5% 35.2% -6.0** -8.3** 187,292 161,362 151,411 -25,930 -35,881
Part-time 8.3% 8.5% 9.3% 0.2 1.0 35,632 36,565 39,987 933 4,355
Full-time 48.2% 54.0% 55.5% 5.8* 7.3** 207,116 232,113 238,641 24,997 31,526
Male Non-participation 40.8% 34.3% 31.5% -6.5** -9.3** 190,550 160,206 147,327 -30,344 -43,223
Part-time 6.4% 7.0% 8.2% 0.6 1.7 30,034 32,899 38,157 2,865 8,123
Full-time 52.8% 58.7% 60.3% 5.9** 7.5** 246,438 273,917 281,538 27,479 35,100
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Share of the choices Change (in pp) Number of people per choice Change
no IWB with iIWB with fIWB iIWB fIWB no IWB iIWB fIWB iIWB fIWB
The 1st quintile
Total Non-participation 99.3% 79.0% 73.3% -20.2** -26.0** 178,094 141,809 131,487 -36,286 -46,607
Part-time 0.6% 2.6% 4.4% 2.0 3.9 1,019 4,618 7,950 3,599 6,931
Full-time 0.2% 18.4% 22.3% 18.2** 22.1** 319 33,006 39,995 32,686 39,676
Female Non-participation 98.8% 79.2% 74.3% -19.6** -24.5** 83,379 66,842 62,673 -16,538 -20,706
Part-time 1.2% 3.1% 4.4% 1.9 3.2 1,019 2,625 3,680 1,605 2,661
Full-time 0.0% 17.7% 21.4% 17.7** 21.4** 0 14,932 18,045 14,932 18,045
Male Non-participation 99.7% 78.9% 72.4% -20.8** -27.3** 94,715 74,967 68,814 -19,748 -25,901
Part-time 0.0% 2.1% 4.5% 2.1 4.5 0 1,994 4,270 1,994 4,270
Full-time 0.3% 19.0% 23.1% 18.7** 22.8** 319 18,073 21,950 17,754 21,631
The 5th quintile
Total Non-participation 14.7% 16.2% 14.6% 1.5 -0.1 26,254 28,882 26,048 2,628 -206
Part-time 9.0% 8.8% 9.4% -0.2 0.4 16,026 15,736 16,812 -290 786
Full-time 76.4% 75.0% 76.0% -1.3 -0.3 136,522 134,184 135,942 -2,338 -580
Female Non-participation 16.3% 18.6% 16.5% 2.4 0.2 15,380 17,626 15,597 2,246 217
Part-time 11.2% 11.0% 11.8% -0.3 0.5 10,635 10,379 11,153 -256 518
Full-time 72.5% 70.4% 71.7% -2.1 -0.8 68,585 66,595 67,850 -1,989 -735
Male Non-participation 12.9% 13.4% 12.4% 0.5 -0.5 10,874 11,256 10,451 382 -423
Part-time 6.4% 6.4% 6.7% 0.0 0.3 5,390 5,357 5,659 -33 268
Full-time 80.7% 80.3% 80.9% -0.4 0.2 67,937 67,589 68,092 -349 155
Notes: Stars in the table denote significant effects (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05); t-tests available upon the request. Data weighted by the weights 
provided by RSO.
Table A4b. Effects of the reforms for couples - percentages and number of people for each choice, total, first and fifth quintiles
Share of the choices Change (in pp) Number of people per choice Change
no IWB with iIWB with fIWB iIWB fIWB no IWB iIWB fIWB iIWB fIWB
Total Non-participation 39.1% 36.0% 38.3% -3.1* -0.8 525,866 484,883 515,241 -40,983 -10,625
Part-time 6.8% 7.3% 6.9% 0.4 0.1 91,751 97,687 92,754 5,935 1,003
Full-time 54.1% 56.7% -54.8% 2.7* 0.7 728,540 763,588 738,163 35,048 9,623
Female Non-participation 52.5% 49.5% 51.7% -3.0 -0.9 353,486 332,986 347,645 -20,500 -5,841
Part-time 6.4% 6.9% 6.5% 0.6 0.1 43,016 46,762 43,848 3,746 832
Full-time 41.1% 43.6% 41.8% 2.5 0.7 276,577 293,331 281,585 16,754 5,009
Male Non-participation 25.6% 22.6% 24.9% -3.0 -0.7 172,380 151,897 167,596 -20,483 -4,784
Part-time 7.2% 7.6% 7.3% 0.3 0.0 48,735 50,925 48,906 2,190 170
Full-time 67.1% 69.9% 67.8% 2.7 0.7 451,964 470,257 456,578 18,294 4,614
The 1st quintile
Total Non-participation 83.9% 76.9% 82.1% -6.9** -1.8 228,222 209,333 223,433 -18,889 -4,789
Part-time 4.5% 5.0% 4.7% 0.4 0.1 12,348 13,487 12,724 1,139 376
Full-time 11.6% 18.1% 13.2% 6.5** 1.6 31,605 49,355 36,018 17,750 4,413
Female Non-participation 94.0% 88.4% 92.3% -5.6* -1.7 127,927 120,307 125,556 -7,620 -2,370
Part-time 1.2% 1.9% 1.5% 0.7 0.2 1,644 2,622 1,977 978 333
Full-time 4.8% 9.7% 6.3% 4.9 1.5 6,516 13,158 8,554 6,642 2,037
Saša Ranđelović, Jelena Žarković Rakić, Marko Vladisavljević, Sunčica Vujić: 
Labour Supply and Inequality Effects of In-Work Benefits: Evidence from Serbia
Table A4a. Effects of the reforms for singles - percentages and number of people for each choice, total, first and fifth quintile (continued)
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Share of the choices Change (in pp) Number of people per choice Change
no IWB with iIWB with fIWB iIWB fIWB no IWB iIWB fIWB iIWB fIWB
Male Non-participation 73.7% 65.4% 71.9% -8.3* -1.8 100,295 89,026 97,876 -11,270 -2,419
Part-time 7.9% 8.0% 7.9% 0.1 0.0 10,704 10,865 10,747 161 43
Full-time 18.4% 26.6% 20.2% 8.2 1.7 25,088 36,197 27,464 11,108 2,376
The 5th quintile
Total Non-participation 10.3% 9.5% 10.2% -0.7 -0.1 27,582 25,642 27,392 -1,940 -190
Part-time 8.4% 9.0% 8.5% 0.5 0.0 22,687 24,118 22,739 1,431 52
Full-time 81.3% 81.5% 81.4% 0.2 0.1 218,571 219,081 218,710 510 139
Female Non-participation 16.1% 15.0% 16.0% -1.1 -0.1 21,591 20,123 21,452 -1,469 -139
Part-time 10.5% 11.0% 10.5% 0.6 0.0 14,051 14,833 14,070 782 19
Full-time 73.5% 74.0% 73.6% 0.5 0.1 98,777 99,464 98,898 687 121
Male Non-participation 4.5% 4.1% 4.4% -0.4 0.0 5,991 5,519 5,940 -472 -51
Part-time 6.4% 6.9% 6.4% 0.5 0.0 8,636 9,285 8,669 649 33
Full-time 89.1% 89.0% 89.1% -0.1 0.0 119,794 119,616 119,812 -177 18
Notes: Stars in the table denote significant effects (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05); t-tests available upon the request. Data weighted by the weights 
provided by RSO.
Ponudba dela in učinki ugodnosti zaposlenih 
na neenakost: ugotovitve za Srbijo
Izvleček
Nizka udeležba na trgu dela skupaj z visokoučinkovito davčno obremenitvijo nizkih ravni plač ustvarja plodna tla za vpeljavo 
ugodnosti zaposlenih v  Srbiji. Naš članek ponuja vnaprejšnjo oceno dveh shem ugodnosti zaposlenih, ki sta usmerjeni k 
spodbujanju ponudbe delovne sile in bolj enaki porazdelitvi dohodka. Metodološki pristop kombinira mikrosimulacijski 
model na osnovi davkov in koristi z diskretnim modelom ponudbe dela. Naši rezultati kažejo, da bi lahko tako individualne 
kot družinske sheme ugodnosti zaposlenih znatno okrepile sodelovanje na trgu dela, četudi bi lahko družinske ugodnosti 
imele nespodbudne učinke na drugega prejemnika dohodka. Večina vedenjskih sprememb se zgodi med najrevnejšimi 
posamezniki z znatnimi redistributivnimi učinki.
Ključne besede: ugodnosti iz naslova zaposlenosti, ponudba delovne sile, neenakost, model diskretne izbire, mikrosimulacija
Table A4b. Effects of the reforms for couples - percentages and number of people for each choice, total, first and fifth quintiles (continued)
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